markets to their average (the price level) and then to money creation, the price level is a nonmonetary phenomenon. In contrast, if the causal relationship goes from the monetary base and money to the price level, the price level is a monetary phenomenon.
When the central bank sets its instrument (the funds rate) at a sustainable value (consistent with no change in inflation), then expected inflation drives the behavior of both the price level and Individuals part with goods for money because they believe that money will possess value in a future exchange. In the simplest case, a central bank persuades the public that the price level will fluctuate around a fixed value. In practice, central banks allow inflation (deflation) and drift in the price level.
The central bank then shapes how the public forms its expectation of the future price level by the way that it makes money creation depend upon macroeconomic shocks.
Economists borrow language from the world of the gold standard in referring to the need for a "nominal anchor." In the gold standard, the dollar (pound) price of gold set by the central bank was the nominal anchor. The parity price of gold deflated by the price level equaled the real price of gold. An increase, say, in the price level unmatched by the real factors determining the value of gold, would lower the real price of gold. Gold would flow out of banks into nonmonetary uses, the money stock would fall, and the price level would return to its original value.
In the case of a small country that pegs its currency to that of a larger foreign country, the nominal anchor is the price level of the foreign country. That domestic price level moves proportionately with the foreign price level and with the terms of trade. In the case of a monetary regime with an interest rate instrument and autonomous determination of the domestic price level, the nominal anchor is the public's expectation of the future price First, the price system works to achieve macroeconomic equilibrium.
Second, the public forms its expectation of inflation in a way that conforms to the nature of the monetary regime. (Of course, monetary policy procedures that result in erratic money creation and unpredictable price level changes can make the formation of those expectations extremely difficult.)
II. Central bank money creation
The quantity theory gives empirical content to the assumption that the price level is a monetary phenomenon. Specifically, with autonomous price level determination (floating exchange rates), the theory embodies the assumption that the nominal quantity of money can change independently of the real quantity of money. The price level must then adjust to restore the real quantity of money, that is, the real purchasing power, the public desires.
Before conducting the classic conceptual experiment of the quantity theory where nominal money changes independently of real money demand, consider the public's demand for real purchasing power. One way to measure purchasing power is the fraction of its nominal (dollar) expenditure the public desires to hold in the form money balances (the inverse of the velocity of money). The assumption that this demand for real purchasing power is welldefined gives the central bank a lever to control the public's nominal expenditure through money creation.
The theory of real money demand became part of neoclassical economics when economists began to treat money as one of the assets in the portfolio held by individuals (McCallum and Goodfriend).
Consider three assets: money, bonds and capital. For the individual not to want to rearrange his portfolio, equality must hold between the rates of return of these three assets.
Specifically, equation (1) (2)
The real world counterpart to the quantity theory conceptual experiment of an exogenous increase in money is a failure by the central bank to move the funds rate in a way that tracks the natural rate. This failure leads to money creation or destruction that forces a change in prices. For example, if the central bank fails to raise the funds rate in line with the natural rate, it creates money. With no change in the price level, real money increases. The public will then rebalance its portfolio by attempting to move out of money into bonds and stocks. In doing so, it increases the prices of these other assets and lowers their yield. Those price and yield changes induce the public to hold larger money balances. At the same time, they also stimulate the nominal expenditure of the public.
However, the assumption that the price level is a monetary phenomenon means that this situation cannot persist. The increase in nominal money that produced the increase in real money provides no additional resources to alter the intertemporal distribution of resources and the natural rate of interest. Ultimately, the additional money creation will raise the price level and the central bank will have to allow the funds rate to rise fully to reflect the rise in the natural rate.
The foundation of this quantity theory view is the assumption that there is a well-defined demand for real purchasing power on the part of the public. Money creation by the central bank endows it with control over the nominal (dollar) expenditure of the public.
III. Indicators and growth gaps
To think about the procedures that the central bank uses to track the natural rate and, in the process, to control money creation, one needs to think about gaps between the real rate of interest and the natural rate of interest. The assumption that the price level is a monetary phenomenon implies that such gaps are "transitory." Changes in the price level will undo the changes in real money that create the gaps. At the same time, the assumption that a gap can exist at all requires some power by the central bank to alter real money and force portfolio rebalancing by the public.
One needs a theory of monetary nonneutrality to explain this power and to give content to the characterization "transitory." A final section discusses monetary nonneutrality.
Corresponding to the real rate-natural rate interest gap is a growth gap. Failure of the central bank to align the real rate that corresponds to its interest rate peg with the natural rate allows a growth gap to emerge. That is, a difference emerges between the actual rate of growth of output and the trend rate of growth of output. Again, divergences between the real rate and the natural rate and between actual and trend real output growth depend upon the hypothesis of monetary nonneutrality. Prices do not adjust instantaneously to deprive the central bank of all ability to influence the real quantity of money and real variables.
To proceed further, one needs to identify the consistencies in the policy procedures that policymakers follow (the policy rule).
In principle, the central bank could solve a model of the economy with a real business cycle core to determine the natural rate that would exist with complete price flexibility. It could then set its interest rate peg to yield a real interest rate equal to the natural rate. In practice, the central bank must fall back on some indicator as a guide. Over some time period that varies positively with the degree of instability in money demand, monetary policymakers could look for changes in the trend rate of growth of money. However, noise in money demand and also the interest sensitivity of money demand has meant in practice that central banks do not use money as a guide.
In practice, the FOMC uses a growth-gap indicator-the difference between actual "underlying" real growth and trend real growth. ("Underlying" growth abstracts from transitory influences on real growth such as weather and strikes.) The FOMC assesses the reliability of its estimate of the growth gap by observing measures of change in excess capacity, especially, the unemployment rate.
The FOMC moves the funds rate above its prevailing value in response to a positive growth gap, and conversely. The FOMC uses this pragmatic search procedure to discover the natural rate. What is relevant for current price-setting behavior is what individuals believe the price level will be in the future.
Although the central bank can influence the public's expectations of inflation through its "brute force" ability to create a negative output gap through monetary contraction, credibility allows that control without output loss.
IV. Central banks as creators of money
Historically One way to understand that the central bank exercises control over the price level through money creation rather than through influence over financial intermediation is to consider the change from an interest rate to a reserves instrument. Reserves creation is not a part of redistributing control over productive assets from savers to investors.
Consider first an interest rate instrument. There is a natural rate of interest that varies positively with the trend rate of growth of real output. The nominal natural rate is the natural rate plus the central bank's inflation target. As described above, the FOMC stabilizes the public's expectation of inflation at a value equal to its implicit inflation target. It then discovers the level of the funds rate that sets the real rate equal to the natural rate by using a growth gap indicator to move the funds rate away from its prevailing value.
Consider now the analogue for a reserves instrument. There is a trend rate of growth of reserves that varies positively with the trend rate of output growth. There is a nominal natural rate of reserves growth that equals this natural rate of reserves growth plus the targeted inflation rate. Analogously with the interest rate case, the FOMC could vary reserves growth to establish credibility for its inflation target. The FOMC could then use the growth gap indicator to adjust judgmentally reserves growth up or down from its prevailing value to keep the growth gap equal to zero on average over time. In this way, the FOMC would maintain over time reserves growth equal to reserves demand consistent with trend real growth and targeted inflation.
In the first case, the central bank has privatized reserves provision by turning the decision on the quantity of reserves over to banks. It has nationalized the setting of the interest rate.
In the second case, the central bank has turned (real) interest rate determination over to the private market while taking direct control over reserves provision. It is hard to see any economic reason for preferring one instrument to the other (an interest rate or a reserves aggregate). However, the case of the reserves instrument makes clear that the central bank exercises its control over the price level through the way that it creates reserves creation rather than through its influence over financial intermediation.
V. Monetary nonneutrality
Monetary nonneutrality arises from a coordination failure.
When the central bank creates and destroys money in an erratic way that forces unpredictable changes in the price level, individual price setters lack a coordinated way to move their dollar prices to maintain the real purchasing power desired by the public while preserving relative prices. Because individual price setters do not capture the externalities from being the first to change their dollar prices to discover the new sustainable price level, they make quantity adjustments initially.
As explained by Friedrich von Hayek (1945) , the price system works well to allow individual price setters to discover relative prices. The reason is that the price system economizes on the information any one entity needs to set a price for its product.
The firm can act on the basis of the market-determined price for its product and the prices of its labor and capital inputs. The price system fails to provide any comparable coordinating mechanism for moving individual dollar prices to the level appropriate for providing the real purchasing power the public desires.
When a firm (with some market power) sets the dollar price of its product, it is solely concerned with the relationship of its dollar price to other dollar prices. That is, it only cares about relative prices-the rate of exchange of its product with other products. However, there is another dimension to its dollar price.
The average of the dollar prices set by firms must be at the level that gives the public the real purchasing power it desires. How do firms set their dollar prices in a way that both gives the public the real purchasing power it desires and delivers equilibrium relative prices?
The coordinating mechanism that maintains the average of individual dollar prices at the level that delivers the public's Consider an individual firm. Assume that its customers face search costs so that the firm possesses some short-term, but no long-term, market power. If the firm lowers its price in the absence of an aggregate shock, it will expect initially only a small increase in demand. Profits will fall because the firm sells about the same amount, but at a lower price. However, over time, demand will increase. If the firm's price was appropriate before, it will then sell too much. Its sales might increase significantly, but it is selling each unit of output at a loss.
With the monetary contraction described above, all firms should lower their dollar prices in tandem to maintain aggregate real sales. However, there is nothing to coordinate a common fall in dollar prices that preserves relative prices. Each individual firm faces the prospect of lowering its price in an isolated fashion and incurring the losses described above. Another way to make this point is to note that the firm that lowers its price first confers a positive externality on society by increasing the purchasing power of money. However, the individual firm does not capture that externality.
This story of price stickiness captures the spirit of the 
